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
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How Terms of Peace Can Be Auto-
matically Prepared While
the War Is Still
Going On

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*A Suggestion
Offered by An American*

HAROLD F. McCORMICK

Written December 1915

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Now Put Forward for Consideration by the Public

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FOREWORD

THE plan contained herein differs from all "peace proposals" that have been put forward hitherto in that *it does not call for the immediate, early or in any sense "premature" cessation of hostilities.* It is assumed that the war will continue its normal course, i. e. until one side has to accept peace terms formulated by the other. Thus the question is not one of discussion of peace, but of statement of peace terms.

What is new is that the belligerents are asked, while continuing to conceal—as they are bound to do—their strategic plans, to enunciate the objects for which they are fighting and place their peace terms in precise and concrete form in the hands of selected neutral countries—whose role would be, not that of mediators but of custodians and "transfer

agents." The terms thus deposited could be changed periodically in accordance with the varying fortunes of the war, the resulting benefit being that each side could know at a given moment precisely what the other was demanding and could examine his own assets, chances and hopes accordingly. In other words, *there would be obtained the quotation of the "cash value" of ultimate peace terms.* It is contended that this would result in: minimum duration of war with maximum of useful effort, thus avoiding all superfluous loss of human life and economic waste.

I

PROSPECTUS

AT PRESENT all eyes are on the War; but while the soldiers are fighting, Statesmanship is confined to home or kindred activities, and Diplomacy only at odd moments and by indirect methods is feeling its way.

The war is in the open; diplomacy is under cover. In the war, there is a continuous point of contact; in diplomacy, there is no point of contact. In the war, by the grinding process of months, each side knows pretty well the status of the other and can reckon with it.

To each side, all elements involved in ultimate Peace Terms are fairly well known to date, *except the peace terms themselves*.—Statesmanship is relatively silent on this point. In the war, reconnoitring can be carried out only to a limited extent; the contact is inevi-

table.—Statesmanship can rely at best only on reconnoitring through diplomacy and cannot utilize its full force at all; why?—Because there is *no battle line* for this activity.

A battle is a blow. A peace overture is a hand held out. Peace Terms put forward are an armour of defense—a display of subjective assurance with a definite objective.—While blows are raining, today every peace overture is withheld which is or would be of genuine portent, for fear of injury to the tenderer. By reason of its being construed as a sign of weakness, each side fears to propose anything like terms, because the other does not and the equilibrium would be lost.

Meantime each awaits proposals from the other, thereby creating an impasse in this direction. And such terms as are indirectly and unofficially put out are intended, either as a show of strength to the other side, or as a stimulus for continued support and cause for loyalty in the minds of compatriots. Mean-

time again, the papers are full of vague reports about peace and each opposing government is busy disowning them, and saying it is for the other side to make proposals.

Thus the battle is the only real force, physical and moral, and diplomacy is weakened by its slightest genuine effort.—In war when one side advances the other side must meet it or lose great advantages. In diplomacy, when one side advances, the other side can hang back and lose no advantage. So, every move of diplomacy is looked upon with natural suspicion and distrust, because there is no chance to advance or retire along definite and established lines. Consequently, it fails to exist as a vital force, or is simply embodied suspicion and distrust. So, at this stage, the soldiers' battle is far ahead of diplomacy, which as yet is confined to collateral activities and in the direct sense has not yet even started forward. As present factors, therefore, are noted the inherent failure of Diplomacy as such and the enforced inactivity of Statesmanship. A suggestion for the liberation of this latter

force is submitted as an aid in the solution of the War Problem.¹

Meantime on the usual basis, the war continues, each side is struggling for "victory" — and what is victory? — a gain, the value of which is not yet known,—a faith — a belief in that which is not seen. But meanwhile the exhaustion of each side and its diminishing resources are seen, definitely in a subjective way, and generally in an objective way.— This is a known factor and a factor of a constantly increasing menace. This definite, increasing menace can be measured up by each

¹ An arbitrary and somewhat academic distinction is here made between the terms "Statesmanship" and "Diplomacy." The latter is used for the purpose of symbolising those efforts suggestive of "negotiations," "peace proposals," "peace overtures," "armistice," etc., which are not involved in the principle of this plan; while the term "Statesmanship" is used as standing for those efforts involved in the preparation and announcement of "Peace Terms." "Statesmanship" is the general, and 'diplomacy' the particular political activity. Between the two there is not opposition, but distinction of degree" and sphere.

respective side, only against the vague and indefinite, though decisive object, victory, with all its illusions and delusions and with its unknown ultimate dimension or with its unreckonable inclination towards one side or the other. This vague and indefinite object therefore is the goal each side is struggling to reach for recuperation and for the justification of all its efforts. Will one side or the other win victory unconditionally and the other side sustain a correspondingly crushing "defeat," or will the conclusion, if divination could reveal it now, possess those elements of such uncertain value as to render the term "victory," disputable and rather a composite, for each side, of good and bad, of satisfactory and unsatisfactory components? Thus are presented the alternatives of unqualified victory for one side and a commensurate defeat for the other or an outcome containing mingled elements of both victory and defeat for either side.

Within a decade, say, there will have to be peace; one side or other will have to make

overtures sooner or later; or intervention of some sort will occur; or the good offices of mediation will be accepted or sought; or surrender will be brought about unconditionally.

Within this period, statesmanship will have to assert itself and make decisions. A protocol will have to be signed. Terms will have to be made known. All the costs, damages and aspirations will have to be considered and weighed, each by its own side as well as by the other, save in the case of unconditional surrender. During this coming epoch of enforced activity, statesmanship will be forced to place itself in harmony with the fortunes up-to-date of the respective armies and navies. Statesmanship will therefore under tremendous pressure and within a comparatively short space of time, have to close up the "gap" existing between its own inactivities, and the progressive activities of the respective armies and navies. Diplomacy, on the other hand, and on the part of each side, will endeavor to procrastinate and hoodwink and manœuvre for position to obtain the best

terms, demanding and declining as if the last word were being uttered. Meanwhile in the field and on the seas, the *truth of fact* will have prevailed. During the armistice, the *truth of an idea* would be expounded. The acts of war would be overvalued or discounted from the point of view of self-interest and, having reached the stage of negotiations, the situation would be taken from the realm of fact into that of conjecture and speculation.

Meantime a rupture might occur and the armistice be broken. Therefore why should statesmanship await "the inevitable hour" of peace, instead of facing its problems now?

In the past, there have been "religious" wars, and "political" wars, and wars for conquest of territory purely, but the incentives to this present war, apart from the paramount questions of humanity, freedom, etc., have arisen out of commerce and trade; to attain the desired end, every expedient of a commercial nature has been brought to bear. Both sides are making a business of the war. Two

gigantic business organizations have been evolved as never before. In all branches of activity, past precedents have been set aside. New methods have been adopted. The resources and ingenuities of the 20th century have been invoked. So, *why not apply these same principles now to the question of Ultimate Peace and Peace Terms and make a business of that*; a business enterprise collateral to other war activities of a humanitarian or economic nature.

Why not reverse the well recognized axiom "when in peace prepare for war" to meet the present situation and thus adapt to our purpose a new principle: "*When in war prepare for peace*"? This parallel by opposites may not be so far amiss, because in peace when a nation prepares for war, it is not alone for the purpose of the possession of the equipment, but largely for the security the knowledge of its possession affords, inasmuch as it can be reckoned with as a known quantity. If the preparations had to be made secretly and without revealing strength, there might

be less tendency on the part of that nation to arm and a corresponding tendency on the part of the rival to take a mistaken leap in the dark. Hence the occasion of past "warlike demonstrations." — Again, in peace time, war is spoken of in hushed tones, as now peace is referred to.

The better side of human nature wants peace, however, and the suggestion contained in this article is to utilise the "preambles of peace" in war-time (keeping them constantly in view while the war is going on), just as warlike demonstrations are used in time of peace; and on the other hand to speak openly and frankly to each other about peace terms now, contrary to the customary silence about war in time of peace.

AND HOW WOULD THIS BE DONE?

Why not formulate and exchange peace terms now, and thus change the future indefinite activities of statesmanship to real activities of the present time?

Why not bring from the future to the present the knowledge of peace terms?

Why not advance the question of Peace Terms from being an unknown quantity to-day to that of a known quantity?

Why not have a "battle line of terms" just as definite and yet as variable and flexible as the military "front" itself?

Why not make provision for Peace Terms to *fluctuate by successive changes made from time to time* according to the varying fortunes and the then chosen policies?

Why not make Peace Terms known, each to the other, and thus add, to mutual knowledge of the situation progressively as to the fighting, and of the situation progressively as to economic conditions, a knowledge of the situation progressively as to Terms of Peace? Then let the war go on, until one side or the other stops and accepts the then conditions of peace as named by the other.

This plan discounts the future only as it brings to the present a Cash Value basis of all that either side would demand as a "sine qua non" to peace. Progressive success by arms in the field would be the ultimate measure of justification of such stated Peace Terms, and this would be the case, whether the Peace Terms were stated beforehand, or not. In the suggestion herein made of Peace Terms imposed, the war proceeds freely and uninterruptedly without arbitrary interference or negotiations, as such; Statesmanship on both sides simply puts forward the Terms of Peace: a statement of Terms on a "*take it*" or "*leave it*" basis—the principle of this plan being that Knowledge is Power in its most effective form.

II

THE PLAN

The features of this "Peace Terms Plan" are that:

1. Upon some mutually agreed date each belligerent¹ should make known to the other side, in a formal and binding way, through the good offices of neutral states (or such other channel as may be agreed upon) the definite and precise conditions, both as to demands and concessions, upon which he will accept peace upon notice given by the other side, and that meantime he is fighting for their adoption; and that, from time to time, he has the right to change these according to the fluctuations of the war and his own desires and necessities, or to harmonize them with his adversary's terms.

2. The consequence of the foregoing will be a knowledge, upon a possible sliding scale,

¹ The term "Belligerent" is used as meaning one of two enemy groups of states.

of exactly what each side is struggling for, with the result that either side may at any time make a computation:—

- a. as to exactly what his terms are,
- b. as to what his successes are,
- c. as to what his resources are,

and can compare these factors, with the conditions offered, as well as with the corresponding factors of the other side.

3. Provided with the foregoing data, each belligerent can cast up the entire situation, having all factors known and at his command, and can determine just how long, all things considered, it will pay him to continue the war.

4. The purpose of this plan is to shorten the war and bring it to an end within the minimum length of time consistent with the maximum effective effort and full use of all resources which will count, and to avoid a prolongation of the war beyond the effective point. *Human life, effort and economic waste beyond this point are saved.* This advantage

applies equally to both sides and is arrived at by their knowing, as against not knowing, the terms for which the struggle is going on.

5. Having knowledge of the terms, *each side knows when the limit of the effective effort has been reached*; without this, each side struggles in the dark, beyond the effective point, to useless exhaustion, each in the blind endeavor to outreach the other, without reckoning the cost.

6. When the end comes, according to this plan, the terms will already have been arrived at "*ipse facto*," and the peace settlement concluded ready for final documentary form and signature.

7. *This plan involves no attempt to alter the outcome of the war as at present waged.*

III

GOOD OFFICES OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

IT is assumed that neutral countries, out of self-interest as well as neighbourliness would agree to propose this plan to the belligerents, if such act of proposal were known to be acceptable to them, or would welcome any request made jointly by the belligerents to serve as intermediaries,¹ and would faithfully carry out any undertaking entrusted to them. A group of four neutral countries is suggested in this capacity to insure a "composite" of "average" neutrality in spirit as well as officially and to the letter. And thus perhaps,

¹ Perhaps the terms "Custodians," "Transfer agents," or "Registrars" would be better appellations and more suitable to designate the responsibilities involved in this plan, as they are "static" rather than "plastic" in nature. The distinction is here made between "intermediaries" implying channel for negotiations and "custodians" as channels for statements of Peace Terms.

such four neutral countries might be selected as would secure a *cohesive third party* to the plan; a party welded together solely for the fulfillment of the functions allotted to it and which by exercising concentrated influence as "custodians" of the original documents containing the respective Peace Terms, might become a moral guarantee for the faithful and impartial operation of the plan.

IV

PROVISIONS OF THE PLAN

Provision 1. Beginning from some stipulated time, each belligerent agrees, until further notice, or until the end of the war, whichever alternative is decided upon, to send monthly, or at any intermediate date or at such intervals as may be agreed upon, to the government seat of each selected neutral country, or through such other channel as may be agreed upon, a full duly authenticated statement of the terms (accompanied by one set of copies), upon which each will agree to stop the war upon notice being given by the other.

Provision 2. A full statement of terms is held to mean the principle of each demand exacted or point conceded, fully and clearly set forth, so that in substance the position is entirely enunciated, and all demands and con-

cessions, taken collectively, form the Peace Terms of that particular belligerent.¹

Provision 3. The neutral governments agree to send copies to each of the belligerents upon the receipt of the originals, which the neutral countries keep in their possession.

Provision 4. The neutral governments agree to certify to the accuracy of the documents as received and of the copies.

Provision 5. The neutral governments agree to notify either belligerent, upon hear-

¹ Each side stating what it yields (if anything) as well as what it demands is a vital part of the proposal:

- a. For the purpose of comparison of Terms.
- b. To harmonize this plan with what would occur in the ordinary method of fighting first and then negotiating.
- c. So that the terms of either side, if and when accepted by the other, would form the prepared substance for Peace Documents, just as each side would want them to be included in the protocol of the final Treaty of peace.

ing from the one that peace is desired upon the then basis of the other's terms.

Provision 6. The neutral governments agree, in case of a request from either belligerent for further information regarding the exact interpretation of the other's terms, to forward such request and upon receipt of the reply to transmit it to the inquirer.

Provision 7. The respective belligerents bind themselves to send at such periods as are agreed upon, a new and authentic set of terms; or, in the event of their not doing so then, or during any succeeding period, it is understood that the last set of terms holds good until new terms are received by the neutral countries, and copies forwarded in due course.

Provision 8. It is understood and agreed that each belligerent, in forwarding new terms, has the right and the power to change or amend the terms of the preceding period as sent out by him, without restriction whatever.

Provision 9. Each belligerent agrees, that, in the event of not fully understanding at any time the full import of any point or principles

contained in any demand set forth by the other, he will promptly address a communication to the neutral countries asking for further light on this or these subjects and each belligerent agrees to furnish further explanation to the other upon request by the neutral countries. In the event of there being no such request, it is assumed that the Peace Terms are clearly understood by the other.

Provision 10. Each belligerent agrees that it will be bound by its own terms, if and as accepted by the other.

Provision 11. Each belligerent agrees *that no terms will be understood to exist or will be imposed except those contained in the original documents* placed in the keeping of the selected neutral countries and in the duly authenticated copies that have been sent to the belligerents themselves.

V

OBJECTIONS TO THE PLAN

1. One or the other side might be unwilling to "show his hand" to the extent of announcing his Peace Terms now, whilst having to fight for them. Terms put forward by the less successful side (at the time) might seem out of proportion to his successes. He might prefer to keep them to himself. And the apparently successful one might hesitate to publish terms tending to stiffen the resistance of the other. Each side might think, that, as possible ultimate loser, he would be stating demands which later on would prove to be not realizable, whereas under the present existing conditions this particular side would have kept his unfulfilled wish officially to himself, thereby avoiding subsequent humiliation. Naturally these would be fatal objections, as any other such would be. But every one now knows each side is fighting for something.

Basic propositions are set forth clearly, even definitely and authoritatively. To-day each side has already gone openly "on record" in official statements of peace terms *of a general character*. Why not now "clinch" the matter, by transforming such vague propositions into *systematic and complete terms, stamped with the official seal?*

2. It might be said, that there is no bond for the fulfillment of this plan and that one side, having tried it, might find it a hardship and withdraw from further participation, or act contrary in other ways to the agreement. The answer to this objection is, that the *purpose of the plan is one which should appeal to both sides as a matter of "mutual self-interest"*—the only bond that belligerents would recognise in any plan. But beyond this it is submitted, that in effect the "custodianship" of neutral countries would provide a moral bond of most definite character and clear interpretation.

3. Again it may be argued, that by following this plan, the terms of each side might in

time assume such stupendous proportions that each side, in hate and desperation, would prefer to perish, in prolonging the war, rather than accept the burden and shame involved in surrender. In reply to this, it is suggested that such stupendous terms would, after all, reflect to some extent the dimensions of the internal loss; and the same spirit that would suggest compromise ordinarily, might in the working of this plan also suggest lowering the terms, as time went on, to tempt the other to yield. By lowering the terms there would be, in effect, the absorption of the excess and the "pocketing" of the loss; and it is presumed that the then more successful belligerent would be tired of prolonging the struggle as well as the less successful one.

4. An objection might be raised on the ground that this plan provides for no compromise. That is true. But if it did provide for compromise, it is fairly certain that neither belligerent would put forward its terms, in a sincere spirit, as "demands" to be insisted upon, (keeping them, in self-interest at the

lowest possible point) ; but such terms would undoubtedly be then put forward as an "asking" price, in the belief that a settlement would be made subsequently upon a lower basis in the course of negotiations. Such a provision for negotiation on the part of belligerents, or of arbitration by neutral countries, would defeat the purpose of the plan by causing an inflation of "Peace Terms," instead of the desired result of a deflation. *If the present plan were adopted, negotiation would be eliminated as a factor.* The situation would inevitably resolve itself into one in which the respective peace terms and war fortunes of each side would harmonize more or less automatically, the one with the other. Then both sides would fight on, until one side came to the decision to accept the responsibility of being the first to signify a desire for the conclusion of the war on the terms of the other, as against sustaining further loss. This would constitute what might be deemed surrender ; but it might, for all that, be the wiser course. The loss involved would be the ac-

ceptance of the terms exacted by the other; the gain would be a saving of further internal loss through the prolongation of the war. Consequently, the immediate loss sustained in surrendering would be partly offset by the gain in conservation of further energy and effort beyond the effective point. In the long run, the side whose terms would be in the greater disharmony with the war fortunes would be the one that could not continue and which would be forced to sue for peace.

In general response to these and various other objections, it is submitted that the trial and subsequent abandonment of this plan would leave the situation at no time substantially worse off than if it were not tried; whereas the alternative result of the trial would be success, and the question therefore resolves itself into the proposition:

IS IT WORTH WHILE TO TRY?

Heretofore statements have been made officially as to what *will be* accomplished, in

order that certain demands *may be* enforced. This plan leaves out the "what will be" and reduces the situation to "what is," keeping pace, as it were, with the armies in the field.

VI

ARGUMENTS FOR THE PLAN

1. The close of the war would not be the result of a blind struggle to exhaustion, but would be due to the opportunity to exercise intelligent foresight, with all factors clearly known.

2. Terms can be studied and put out by each side with more care by making use of the intervening time, rather than by leaving everything to the restricted time of the final peace negotiations.

3. Each side can compare the terms of the other with its own resources and fortunes and can determine just how long it pays to keep up the war. Month by month and period by period, as each side sees the terms of the other, the tendency will be to yield the unimportant and hold to the important. Thus, so far as the respective fortunes of the war allow it, the "opposing" terms will get nearer

to one another all the time and become simplified by the process of elimination. This plan contains therefore the principles of "natural selection" and of the "survival of the fittest," the discarding of the least desirable, involving, by the time the terms "get set" and reconciled, the greatest number of desired points considered possible by each side. And thus it gives each side a chance to know what the other is driving at, and to make comparisons. The exchange which one belligerent makes for the benefit of knowing the terms of the other is to allow the other side to know his terms in return, and even this feature would be expected to work to the advantage of the first in the long run.

4. It will tend to put a stop to all extravagant discussion and do away with the informal, yet officially spoken challenges, counter charges and aspersions at present unavoidably indulged in. These have the painful effect of multiplying and expanding the original grievances in cumulative form as the desperation of the situation increases, with the result

that fresh animosities grow out of the original grievances, so that the realm of fact is abandoned for that of delusion. The plan here proposed tends to keep these artificialities down to a working basis.

5. The minds of the belligerents would inevitably be partially turned from the total concentration upon the scene of war, and would find room for thoughts of peace while at war. —The psychology of the situation would adjust itself to the normal balance of all things, and the various belligerents, instead of flying into the face of despair or following the path of unknown destiny, would be dealing in known quantities. *A receptive attitude towards peace would evolve*, and “to define Terms of Peace would take away the worst fears . . .”

6. It takes account of any questions of right or wrong, or justice or injustice, as such, for those claims on either side would be practically embodied in the Peace Terms. No attempt to invade the realm of the “amour-propre” of either belligerent nor to lessen

their rightful sensibilities is involved. It is not intended to be material in this concept. But the point is emphasized, that in the ordinary nature of things all these claims of sentiment would be eventually expressed in the ultimate terms of peace at the close of the war, to the fullest extent on each side; and the proposition is simply submitted that these could be stated in their equivalents now, as well as later.

7. It may appeal alike to those who want the war to keep up, and to those who want peace to be brought about. In this contradiction, the distinction lies in the different viewpoints from which the war is regarded: one section seeing in the continuance of the war the best way to realize national aspirations, or to get safely out of a predicament; while another may desire to see peace established for the same reasons. To reconcile these different viewpoints (according to the "pragmatic principle"), it is submitted that a full knowledge of Peace Terms would substitute for the shadowy horizon, the "sunlight of

consciousness" by which the exact differences and realizable possibilities of harmony could be clearly seen as time went on. It is certain that neither side could reasonably say now, in objection to this proposal, that it "does not want to discuss peace," for that is not the question. *The question is not one of discussion of peace, but of statement of Terms of Peace.*

If one or other side does not want to discuss peace, it is presumably because he believes victory will eventually be his on his own terms. Nothing in this plan precludes such a result.

8. There is nothing to prevent either side making its terms as high as is wanted, putting what is in its mind upon paper and thus giving the conception a stated form. Knowing in general now, what the last stage of desire is, each side could just as well already embody such terms, while peace itself is not yet at hand. The announcement would not prevent the demander from getting them, if he is so confident, and their realization might even

be hastened. All depends on success, as would be the case in any event.

9. *Exorbitant or out-of-proportion terms, eventually would not pay*, for the reason that the divergence between the dimension of such terms and the fortune of war of that particular belligerent would become so perceptible that the other side would prefer to go on fighting. The belligerent putting forward excessive terms, would have to reduce them, if he was hard pressed, because he would come to realize that he could not get peace until he did. Each side "could afford to define the terms of a just peace."

Any victories gained by one belligerent during any given period, immediately resulting in a call for peace by the other belligerent could not be rightly claimed to justify an increase or rise in the terms of the former as previously announced, and this for two reasons:

First. The former terms hold good and binding up to that time, without any "extras." —

Second. The fact that such victories cause the other side to call for Peace should make them be looked upon as paying for themselves on a "*Quid-pro-quo*" basis without further compensation resulting, because they are the instruments and means by and through which the victor's terms then outstanding are secured. No victories imaginable within this period, and pending a new set of peace terms, would be cheaply bought, if such victories were the immediate and direct cause of the acceptance of the victor's terms by the then defeated side.

If on the other hand such victories did not result in a suspension of hostilities, they could well be included and expressed and recognized in the next set of Peace Terms put forward by the belligerent realizing such victories, in the form of a fluctuation upward of his Peace Terms, as compared with the last set.

10. It would prevent a premature peace on

terms unsatisfactory to either side and would minimize the chance of a renewal of hostilities. If each side went to the limit of efficiency, the loser would realize at the end that it had done its best, thus leaving no justifiable remorse for unexpended effort, with its baneful effect upon future points of view and averting the immediate danger of that malignant spectre — "reprisals."

11. It would make for the better understanding which always accompanies the spirit of frankness and candour, however distasteful the existing situation might be. Spies to-day do not have the recognition of military honor as do soldiers in uniform. Just so it is submitted that a "battle line of Peace Terms" inspired and decreed by Statesmanship, would place this method on the same footing as straight forward war activities.

12. The feature of "fluctuations" meets the point of those who would object to the announcement of Peace Terms now, on the ground that, if announced now, and crystallized in single final form, they would become

obsolete by reason of future events and changed conditions, and that therefore it would be better to await the end in order that the terms might be dealt with under the then existing conditions. The provision for "fluctuations" possesses the advantage of knowledge of present terms, without the disadvantage of their becoming obsolete. No Peace Terms could be announced now which would be final in form and could hold good for all time to come. They could not be put out in such form with sincere conviction as to their continuous value. "Fluctuations" would keep the periodically contemporary peace terms ever applicable, ever sincere and ever effective until the end. Each set of peace terms put out would possess full current value.

13. The adoption of this plan would tend to maintain the unity of each of the two belligerent groups of nations. No one can be blind to the fact, that great efforts are being made at present (witness the recent and imminent congresses) to secure for each side strategic and economic unity. This ought to

be of good augury for the proposed community of action regarding peace terms. The formulation and announcement of *one set* of Peace Terms by each side would constitute a further bond of union and afford a stronger guarantee. The war would then comprise only two sides, each absolutely consolidated, and pledged to act, all for one and one for all.

14. The Plan places the outcome of the war upon a net "Cash-Value" basis of liquidation for any given date, as against that of a "negotiable note" with a long future maturity. It is like a draft "on demand." It might also be likened to a "one price" transaction over the counter, regarding a recognized commodity, the price fluctuating under the law of demand and supply, as against barter and trade over an article of unknown and individual value. "The suggestion is that they (the belligerents) should define not in abstract phrases but in fairly concrete terms the price of peace."

15. In general, each set of terms put for-

ward would presumably tend to embody the increased cost of the war during the previous period, and so the terms of each would be a constantly rising tide, subject only to fluctuations, independent of this steady increase. This steadily increasing tax officially stated, with its deep significance and world wide effect, could hardly fail to have and to hold the attention of the belligerents. Its growing size would cause the "battle line of terms" to become as potential a factor of consideration and deliberation as the war strategy itself and its results. The "means" and the "end" would go side by side. The cost of "victory," or the prolongation of the war could be measured at one time with the value of the prize or of a partition of it. The "net" result would have its just recognition.

16. Every month the toll of human lives increases in terrifying proportions. Every month by which the war could be shortened would save therefore countless lives. It is by no means certain that a premature peace would save lives in the long run, for the dan-

ger of a fresh outbreak of hostilities would persist. But suppose a war continued up to the last effective point, but not one minute beyond, how great the saving in human life on both sides would then be! Then tragic as the war is at best, it would be a humane war by comparison, if it stopped the minute it became certain to one side that further effort was vain.

* * *

In closing one might venture to suggest that imagination can picture three bases upon any one of which the war might be settled:

First. Upon conditions which include principles relating to permanent unity among nations, definitions of international rights, tribunals for settling differences—all tremendous and eternity reaching problems.

Second. Upon conditions relating to a final and comprehensive settlement of the

immediate issues at stake, immense as they are.

Third. Upon conditions unsatisfactory and incomplete, arrived at under pressure and by negotiation, and leaving a feeling on both sides of unfinished differences.

The First may be too much to expect as the direct outcome of this war.

The Third might be considered deplorable.

The Second would seem to be more nearly the outcome which this Plan seeks to attain.

VII

CONCLUSION

IT IS realized, in submitting these pages,—it may be presumptuously—that it is a big task outlined and suggested. One may have only limited faith in its applicability, owing to the many obstacles which would be encountered at every turn; and yet it does seem as though it might serve the purpose claimed, if it could be put into operation as a matter of self-interest. Under the stress of a time like this, when human life is at stake at every move, each suggestion of a helpful purpose has its proper place and value and perhaps this one has some place and some value. At any rate, it is put forward in a submissive attitude of understanding, that very likely it may go for naught. If, however, this suggestion should be the means of prompting some other of more practical application, or should reach some of the belligerents so that its content,

as a general proposal, would receive consideration, it will then have served in one or other way its purpose.

With merely practical aims in view, no attempt has been made to consider the past literature.

To those who, with untiring zeal and friendly interest, have rendered kind assistance in the development and elaboration of this idea, I make grateful acknowledgment.

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HOTEL BAUR-AU-LAC, ZURICH.

VIII

POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENT TO PLAN

A SUPPLEMENTAL feature might be added to this plan, if it was thought desirable, *by incorporating the element of "Publicity."* In this event the neutral countries, upon receiving the various documents containing the Terms of each side, in addition to handing them privately to each belligerent in exchange, according to the regular plan thus far proposed, could be allowed to publish them simultaneously and officially in the newspapers of their respective countries. In this way the Peace Terms would be "Publicly Proclaimed." The Status of Peace Terms, would be known to the World, as in the case of the War Status. "Statesmanship" would come out "in the open." There would be an open battle line of Peace Terms. The world would turn to thoughts of peace while at war. There would be afforded to all, enlightened knowl-

edge of the fighting objective of each side, changing apprehension to assurance, mystification to clearness. It would be like a "score-card," or a "listing of securities" on an exchange. No doubt this feature, if it were practicable, would give a wonderfully added strength to the plan as a whole, as helping to secure fulfillment by illuminating dignity and honour. Nations have guarded, from time immemorial, with jealous concern a spotless escutcheon on these two counts. Why should it be unnatural to consider of great value a like sensitiveness in carrying out such a plan as is proposed in these pages, involving not only from a National, but also from an International point of view, a step towards the solution of a question of such magnitude as the world has never seen hitherto in its history?



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